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Relationality Without Obligation 
 
Abstract: Some reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as 
that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that 
are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that 
there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational 
theories of morality. 
 
1. Introduction 
Individual deliberation about action is not always a private affair. Sometimes one person’s reasons for 
action (their practical reasons) are significant for others. Some practical reasons make essential 
reference to the relations between the agent for whom they are reasons, and others whose lives are 
entwined, in one way or another, with the predicament in which the agent finds themselves. These 
reasons can be thought of as relational. The most familiar example of such relational reasons are 
those represented by the moral rights of others. But in this paper I will argue that the scope of 
relational practical reasoning is broader than the domain of moral rights. 
A school of thought that has recently gained traction in moral philosophy can be labelled 
Relational Deontic views. Prominent advocates of Relational Deontic views include Stephen Darwall 
(2006, 2013), R. Jay Wallace (2019), and Ariel Zylberman (2019). These views are united around the 
core claim that at the heart of morality are duties that people owe to one another, where it is the 
authority that others have – to claim what they are owed – that underpins the justification of moral 
conduct. Put another way, they claim that moral reasoning is relational. 
In this paper I will press a criticism, not against this core claim of the Relational Deontic 
views, but against a picture that is sometimes suggested by their accounts, and which might be seen to 
favour them. The picture to which I will object is one in which not only are moral obligations 
fundamentally relational, but relational reasoning is fundamentally a matter of moral obligations. It 
depicts the domain of relational practical reasoning – where our actions matter for others in ways that 
license interpersonal reactive attitudes – as a domain that is centred around and explained by 
interpersonal obligations. Thus, the specific view at the heart of this picture, the rejection of which 
will be my goal, is this: 
Deonticism: deontic interpersonal relations fully ground practical relationality. 
Setting out what is entailed by the notion of practical relationality will be my first task, 
undertaken in the next section below. After that, I will explain the attraction of deonticism and discuss 
the role that it plays in the accounts of the Relational Deontic views. Then I will press my objection to 
deonticism, providing a counterexample which illustrates that practical relationality is broader than 
interpersonal deontic relations. 
 
2. Practical Relationality 
Practical relationality is that aspect of the lives of agents in which one’s conduct directly affects one’s 
status in relation to others in such a way as to affect the appropriateness of reactive attitudes between 
people. More specifically, practical relationality can be defined as consisting of the following four 
analytically connected phenomena.1 
(i) Standing 
The normative status of being the source of relational reasons for another person, e.g. 
possessing a claim right. 
(ii) Relational reason 
A practical reason grounded in another person’s standing, e.g. a directed duty. 
(iii) Normative Injury 
The normative status of having one’s standing go without due recognition, e.g. a wronging. 
(iv) Accountability relations 
The sequences of reactions and transactions made appropriate only by normative injuries, e.g. 
resentment, apology, forgiveness. 
Our lives as agents involve practical relationality when we are faced with reasons to act that are 
grounded in other people’s standing, where the ignoring or flouting of those reasons would constitute 
normative injuries, and where such normative injuries make appropriate sequences of reactions and 
transactions.2  
 
1 In articulating relational reasoning in terms of these four elements I am loosely following Wallace (2019: 5-
11). 
2 The definitions I provide here are circular, but the argument of this paper is neutral on the question of whether 
non-circular, reductive accounts could be given of relational normative concepts. Darwall (2006: 11-15) and 
Wallace (2019: 159) both deny that relational notions are reducible to non-relational notions. 
The most familiar examples of this set of phenomena are deontic examples of rights and 
obligations. For instance, consider the right of a person, A, not to be wantonly harmed by B. It may be 
that B has a variety of reasons not to harm A, some grounded in the simple setback such harming 
would bring to A’s welfare, others, perhaps, grounded in the negative consequences that might befall 
B themselves were they to harm A. But besides these B also should not harm A simply because A has 
a certain normative status that provides reason not to harm them. In this case, that status is that of 
having a right not to be harmed, which is a standing that consists in being the source of obligations for 
others not to wantonly harm A. Deontic standing is the authority to claim, demand, and insist on what 
is owed. Correspondingly, a deontic relational reason is an obligation owed to another person. 
If A’s right is violated by B, then this entails a normative injury to A. A distinctive quality of 
normative injuries – pointed out by Wallace (2019: 9) – is that they are not straightforwardly 
reducible to the harms brought to agents by the actions in question. In the deontic example, where B 
has wronged A, having owed it to A to φ, but having failed to φ. B’s action (or lack thereof) changes 
A’s normative status to that of having been wronged by B. And this status is not reducible to whatever 
harm the failure of B to φ might have brought to A. Indeed, it may be that in fact it is good for A that 
B did not φ, but this would not alter the fact that A was wronged by B’s behaviour. For instance, I was 
secretly very glad to realize that my cousin had forgotten his promise to visit me; but in forgetting, he 
wronged me nonetheless. 
When normative injuries are incurred in the deontic sphere, the ensuing accountability 
relations are characterized by the appropriateness of a familiar set: resentment, apology, moral repair 
and forgiveness.3 The deontic example makes clear that it is common in our practical lives for our 
agency to be linked in this array of ways with the normative statuses of other people. 
However, contrary to the convention established by the treatment of these topics by the likes 
of Darwall, Wallace and Zylberman, I want to emphasize that such interpersonal rights and 
obligations are only that: examples of relational reasons. It is at least conceptually possible that each 
 
3 Among proponents of Relational Deontic views, there is some disagreement about whether these positional 
standings that individuals have – to expect apologies and to forgive – are features of the most fundamental sort 
of moral duties owed to one another (Wallace, 2007, 2019), or whether they are rather features only of the 
distinctively bipolar subset of moral duties (Darwall, 2013: 23). 
of the categories (i)-(iv) could include entities that are unrelated to obligations and duties. That is, it is 
conceivable that a relational reason could be merely a pro tanto reason, to be weighed in favour of an 
action, but without purporting to provide conclusive reason for that action.  
Non-obligatory relational reasons would be grounded in the standing that another person had 
to be the source of such non-obligatory reasons. If such reasons were ignored or otherwise flouted, 
then the standing of the other person would be violated, constituting a normative injury. Non-deontic 
normative injuries would make appropriate their own sequences of accountability-holding reactions 
and transactions. 
Before moving on, I would like to note an important point about practical relationality on 
which I think the proponents of Relational Deontic views are correct. Namely, that this bundle of 
phenomena require an explanation. Or perhaps they require several explanations. One explanandum 
which my scheme must deal with is why all and only these four features should be bundled together. 
The answer to that lies in the deep conceptual connections between them, where each is defined in 
terms of the others. A deeper explanandum, though, is why it is that our practical lives appear to 
contain such relational considerations as those included in practical relationality. 
This latter explanandum invites a pressing line of scepticism. We can well entertain the 
possibility of a form of moral scepticism that does not deny that some actions are good and others 
bad, but asks why it is that any actions should be thought to be owed to others. And on the back of 
their scepticism about relational duties, this sceptic could ask why we should ever think that other 
people have legitimate claims on us, that there are any such things as wrongs, or that interpersonal 
practices of accountability relations are anything more than quaint, contingently constructed 
absurdities – to be dispensed with. 
A satisfactory treatment of this explanandum could debunk it, by making full sense of its 
appearance without confirming its appropriateness. The alternative to a debunking explanation would 
be a vindicatory one, and since that would call for no revision of our customary and deeply ingrained 
moral sentiments, a vindicatory account would be preferable, other things equal. Such an account 
would show the customs of practical relationality to be appropriate features of moral life. The 
explanans would be a foundation in practical thought for thinking that relational reasons exist, along 
with the concomitant standing, normative injuries, and the legitimacy of relevant reactive attitudes. 
 
 
3. The Deonticist Picture 
A vindicatory explanation of practical relationality is offered, putatively, by the deonticist picture – 
the picture which it is my goal in this paper to dispel. It says that relational reasons, and the array of 
relational phenomena that they generate, are grounded in deontic interpersonal relations, that is, 
relations of right and duty between people. In other words, it is the fact that we owe things to others 
that explains the appearance of a relational form to some of our practical reasoning. The vindicatory 
argument goes like this: 
(1) Relations of right and duty are normatively well-founded (supported by Relational 
Deontic views) 
(2) Practical relationality consists only in relations of right of duty (supported by 
deonticism). 
(3) Therefore, practical relationality is normatively well-founded. 
On the face of it, this is an attractive view because it draws on a detailed theory of interpersonal 
normativity, as is provided by the Relational Deontic views, to give an adequate explanation of 
practical relationality. 
In the course of vindicating the relational structure of some practical considerations, 
deonticism also specifies which considerations have that structure. On this picture, all and only 
interpersonal obligations have the relational features identified above. As a consequence, if there is a 
situation in which a person seems to have a relational reason (or any other feature from (i)-(iv)), 
deonticism is committed to the following disjunctive claim: either that apparently relational reason is 
not really relational, or it is an obligation.  
Defenders of Relational Deontic views have at times, between the lines, suggested the view 
that all reasons that are relational (in the rich sense at issue here) must also be obligatory. For 
instance, in the well-known opening sections of The Second-Person Standpoint (SPS), Darwall (2006: 
11) says that ‘[s]econd-personal reasons are invariably tied to […] the authority to make a demand or 
claim’. It is clear from the passages preceding this quote that Darwall’s conception of a ‘second-
personal reason’ is supposed to match what I have called ‘relational reasons’. The notions of claims 
and demands typically express an obligation – both in SPS and in more general usage. It is thus easy 
to see how one could be led to think that Darwall’s Relational Deontic account of morality involves 
the espousal of this part of the deonticist picture, that all relational reasons are obligatory. 
However, the connection between the Relational Deontic views and deonticism is more 
complicated than it first seems. Earlier in SPS, Darwall identifies requests among the forms of address 
that typically imply second-personal reasons, and since requests (presumably) present non-obligatory 
reasons, this suggests that Darwall thinks there can be non-obligatory relational reasons. Indeed, in a 
series of papers about topics that he calls ‘second-personal attitudes of the heart’, Darwall (2016, 
2017) has expressly addressed the matter of non-obligatory relationality. Clearly, then, it is not the 
case that proponents of Relational Deontic views always expressly endorse the picture that follows 
from deonticism. Nor is it obvious that this picture is an inadvertent commitment of their moral 
theories.4 So, the point of objecting to deonticism is not to correct a deep error in the Relational 
Deontic views. 
The point that is more deeply relevant to Relational Deontic views is about the explanation of 
relational practical reasoning. If deonticism were true then Relational Deontic views would provide an 
exhaustive, vindicatory explanation of practical relationality in general. That is, they tell us why it is 
that there appear to be relational considerations of the sort discussed above (and, while they are at it, 
why this is as it should be). But if deonticism is false – if not all of practical relationality is fully 
grounded in deontic interpersonal relations – then the explanatory adequacy of Relational Deontic 
views is more limited.  
At the least, some further explanation must be given to make sense of the apparently 
relational structure of those parts of our practical lives that are not connected to interpersonal 
 
4 Besides Darwall’s strict association (just mentioned) between second-personal reasons, and claims and 
demands, there are other deonticist moments in the writings of proponents of Relational Deontic views. 
Deonticist predispositions are suggested in the approach – shared by Darwall, Wallace (2019, chpt. 2) and 
Zylberman (2019: 2) – that begins the analysis of relational morality with an account of the form of 
interpersonal obligations. A further point at which Relational Deontic views have seemed to promote deonticism 
is a specific argument that occupies Chapter 3 of Wallace’s The Moral Nexus. There, Wallace argues that what 
he calls ‘the relational interpretation of morality’ is uniquely well-placed to make sense of the relational features 
of morality – which reflect the features I have described above as practical relationality. Deonticism represents 
one intuitive way to understand how Wallace might intend that vindicatory explanation to go. 
obligations. But if there is a domain of practical reasoning that all shares a distinctive relational 
structure then a good explanation of that phenomenon would explain that distinctive relational 
structure everywhere it is found: a unified explanation of the whole domain. Relational Deontic views 
are restricted to consideration of deontic relations. Thus, if deonticism is false and there are non-
obligatory relational reasons, then this poses a question for Relational Deontic views, namely, 
whether they are compatible with the best explanation of practical relationality in general. 
 
4. Non-Obligatory Relationality 
By way of an argument against deonticism, consider the following example of a relational reason that 
is not an obligation. Suppose you and I are friends. I ask you to come camping with me at the 
weekend – which, please suppose, is something we both typically enjoy. Without needing to say so 
explicitly, we both understand that the reason I have presented in my request that you join me is not 
an obligation. It’s up to you, and I would only want you to say yes if you would actually like to. 
Naturally, I hope that you agree to come, and as it happens, so does my housemate, Nadia, who would 
like the house to herself for those days. 
But you decline, citing the fact that though you don’t have any other plans for the weekend, 
you don’t really want to come camping with me. Let’s suppose that in the context of our friendship, 
such an apparently blunt reply is not rude as you know that I appreciate your honesty. 
The question is whether the reason created by my request is relational. I submit that it is. It is 
relational because it exemplifies the four phenomena detailed above: standing, relational reason, 
normative injury, and attitudes of accountability. For ease of explanation, it will be clearest to start 
with the normative injury that is brought about by your declining my invitation. Since both parties to 
the invitation understood it to present a non-obligatory reason, it is clear that your saying no cannot 
have wronged me. Rather, we might think of this sub-obligatory normative injury as a snubbing. To 
see that this is a normative injury of a kin with a wronging, note the contrast between the way your 
answer affects me, and the way it affects my housemate Nadia who had also privately hoped that you 
would say yes. Nadia and I are both disappointed that you do not appreciate my company as much as I 
had hoped. But I alone, whose request you declined, as the one who put my neck out by inviting you, 
and whose status in our relationship was at stake in the request, am snubbed; Nadia is not. Being 
snubbed may be embarrassing for me, and in that way harmful above and beyond the harm of having 
been disappointed. But just as in the case of wronging, the normative dimension (being snubbed) is 
not reducible to the harm (being embarrassed). If I am for some extraneous reason glad to be snubbed, 
and not at all embarrassed, this will not alter the fact that you have snubbed me. 
The relationship between you and I is altered by our unfortunate transaction in ways that are 
structurally analogous to the normative aftermath of a wrong in attitudes of accountability. In the first 
instance, though I lack the standing to resent you, I feel hurt, let down, and disappointed in you, for 
snubbing me.5 These sentiments seem to be akin to resentment in having as their object an agent (you) 
qua the one responsible for bringing them about. They are not merely attitudes of regretting an event, 
they are attitudes of regretting an action – your action. They do not just express a wish that it had not 
happened, but that you had not done it. What’s more, my disappointment in you is not just a private 
matter of mine but represents a change in the normative dynamics of our friendship. For instance, my 
inclination to grant requests of yours may be diminished, among other things. 
Again, since no wrong has been committed, you do not owe me an apology. But suppose that 
you came to regret having snubbed me, and the hurt it may have caused. (Unlike wrongs, snubs are 
not necessarily regrettable.) If you did feel regret, then saying so to me would take responsibility for 
the regrettable action in just the same way as would an apology. Likewise, though I do not have the 
standing to forgive you exactly, in the right circumstances I could let my feelings of hurt and 
embarrassment be forgotten. If I told you so, then this would release you from my judgement and 
repair our normative standing with respect to one another in just the same way as forgiveness. 
The appropriateness of these dyadic reactive attitudes entails that among the bundle of 
original reasons that I presented to you in my request was a relational reason. Similarly to a directed 
duty, this was a reason not to bring about an interpersonal normative injury. Again, this is an aspect of 
the situation that distinguishes my position from Nadia’s. Whilst you might have wanted to please her 
 
5 My point here is similar to one developed by Ulrika Carlsson (2017) who argues that cases of unreciprocated 
interpersonal valuing-attitudes can be apt grounds for an attitude that she calls tragic resentment. However, it is 
left slightly unclear from Carlsson’s discussion whether she thinks of tragic resentment as exemplary of all the 
features of practical relationality, and so whether that sentiment poses a problem to deonticism. Thus, though 
my thought here is similar in spirit to hers, she and I focus on different ramifications. 
by coming on the trip, your reason to do so is quite different from your reason to please me as the one 
making the request and exposing themselves to being snubbed. 
Finally, it seems clear that if there was a relational reason for you not to snub me, then there 
was a mirrored standing of mine not to be snubbed. In other words, there was a structural difference 
between mine and Nadia’s hope that you would come. Whereas hers pertained only to the possibility 
of your joining us on the trip, mine pertained also to your acceding to my request and thereby 
honouring my standing that you would not disappoint my exposed hope for our relationship. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The camping invitation presents a reason that appears to have exactly the same relational structure as 
an interpersonal obligation despite not being obligatory. That reason is relational in that it mirrors a 
standing on behalf of another person with whose life the reason-facing agent’s own predicament is 
entwined. That standing is keyed to the possibility of a distinctly normative injury that would be 
brought about should the reason be neglected. And such an injury would make appropriate a sequence 
of attitudes of accountability that are structurally similar to resentment, apology, and forgiveness. This 
example – and the possibility of others like it – constitute a problem for the thesis that I have called 
deonticism: that deontic interpersonal relations (that is, obligations) explain practical relationality. 
The problem, in short, is that it seems that the domain of practical relationality is broader than the 
domain of deontic interpersonal relations. 
A range of options are open to the proponent of deonticism in response to this problem. One 
would be to concede that interpersonal obligations explain only the obligatory dynamics that are 
manifested in some cases of practical relationality. Some further explanation would then be required 
for the general appearance that our practical reasoning can sometimes have a relational form: an 
explanation which provides a unified account of obligatory and non-obligatory relational reasons. One 
alternative option would be to hold fast to the deonticist thesis and deny that the reasons presented in 
requests like the camping invitation are relational in senses (i)-(iv). I hope to have shown that this 
option is at least counter-intuitive.6 
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